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This paper uses an innovative analysis of an individual‟s cognitive processes to 
investigate a real-life example of processing rendered subconcious by a mask that 
shared characteristics with the varied feature.  In about half the participants, 
integrative performance on the object was better than analytical performance on 
the feature.  The cognitive processes mediating this achievement varied among 
assessors.  In a few, the integrative judgment discriminated levels of the feature 
directly through sensory processes (subceptually).  The others succeeded by 
implicitly using the analytical concept to achieve feature discrimination in overall 
object recognition.   
 
 







 One technique for investigating subconscious perceptual performance (subception) is 
to mask the stimulus.  The usual criterion of awareness of a stimulus is the person professing 
experience of that feature of the situation in terms of its culturally recognised concept.  Hence 
if that analytical response was not affected by the stimulus while another response was, the 
evidence is that the stimulus was perceived subconsciously via that other response.  A mask 
can be penetrated in this way by a response that is more integrative than the conceptually 
specific response.  An example is a judgment or action on the whole situation that was 
sensitive to the target stimulus despite the mask confusing or distracting the descriptive 
analysis of that feature.  The experiment reported here used degree of preference for a version 
of the participant‟s usual drink of coffee as the integrative judgment and the intensity of that 
sample‟s bitterness as the analytical judgment.  The stimulus was the taste of caffeine in the 
drink and the mask was the complex flavour of the roasted coffee beans from which the drink 
originated.   
 This type of evidence is widely used to demonstrate theoretical principles of 
unconscious processing.  Limiting cases are set up in the laboratory.  Typically, the stimulus 
is so brief or weak that it could never be identified.  A mask can be used to weaken the signal 
from the stimulus relative to background noise.  Yet the stimulus can still affect a response to 
which it is relevant, as in priming (e.g., Forster & Davis, 1984; Lamme, Zipser & Spekreijse, 
2002).   
The general investigation of subception is considerably more difficult.  Often stimuli 
are present for at least some seconds, as is the case with tastants in foods and drinks.  Also the 
stimuli are normally at strengths that would be perceived readily in isolation, such as caffeine 
in water at the levels that are natural in coffee.  To be ecologically valid, experiments need in 
addition to use masks that are available in the situation being investigated, like the many bitter 
compounds in roast coffee.   
A common further problem is that the measurement of subception has to be 
retrospective.  That is, the interest is in what can be said now about what might or might not 
have been in consciousness at some time in the past.  The issue is whether or not what was 
said or done about the situation at that earlier time was influenced by awareness of the 
analytical concept used in the current explicit verbal criterion of conscious processing of the 
stimulus.  Was the initial preference for a cup of coffee influenced by the effect of caffeine on 
taste that was conceptualised as bitterness in the later test?  The experiment reported here 
addresses that question for each of its participants.  
 3 
Normed discrimination 
Detection sensitivity „threshold‟ has been used to identify past occurrence of 
subconscious perception (e.g., Cheesman & Merikle, 1986; Merikle & Reingold, 1998; 
reviewed by Merikle, Smilek & Eastwood, 2001).  The particular feature of an object or 
situation was detected by an integrative response such as expressing a preference for the 
object having that feature over objects that lacked it.  Yet the feature was not detected later by 
a response specifically describing that feature.  The paradigmatic case is a supposedly 
subliminal flash on a cinema screen of the brand name of an icecream followed by an increase 
in sales of that brand to the audience, with the participants subsequently denying that the 
brand‟s name was shown on the screen.  
Booth, Conner and Gibson (1989) pointed out that discriminative sensitivities can be 
used for the same purpose.  They briefly described an experiment in which a stimulus within a 
familiar object was presented at varied levels with constant masking.  As stated above to 
illustrate the principles of subception, the stimulus was the taste of caffeine and the mask was 
the flavour of the individual‟s usual drink of coffee.  Individuals‟ Weber fractions for caffeine 
were calculated for judgments of degree of preferences and intensity of bitterness (bitter being 
the standard term for conceptualising the stimulus).  Booth and colleagues found that, in over 
half the participants, the integrative judgments of preference were sensitive to differences 
between levels of the stimulus but later analytical judgments of bitterness were not.  Such a 
pattern of performance could be regarded as the discriminative analogue of perception 
without conscious detection.  
That preliminary report left open the key question if coffee preference was decided by 
unmonitored use of the concept of bitterness before the experimenter introduced the word 
bitter.  The assessors observed later to be analytically non-discriminative might nonetheless 
have been discriminating amounts of the stimulus under its concept when deciding the 
preferences from the amounts.  Such issues can be addressed by a subsequently developed 
theory of interactions among multiple discriminations from a norm within an individual on an 
occasion (Booth & Freeman, 1993).  That theory has recently been fully implemented in a 
software tool for calculating a variety of the mental processes that could be mediating the 
discriminative performance of an integrative judgment.  This paper presents the results from 
such calculations on the data partly reported by Booth et al. (1989).  
Multiple discrimination scaling 
 The theory developed by Booth and Freeman (1993) from work such as that by 
Conner et al. (1988) distinguishes what is explicit in observed psychophysical functions from 
what is implicit in interactions between hypothesised covert functions that also transform 
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information.  The Weber fractions reported by Booth et al. (1989) came from two 
psychophysical functions of distances of the stimulus from the norm of the personally 
preferred level of the stimulus in the familiar object.  Two stimulus-response functions are the 
minimum for a theory of mental interactions.  The functions can be from two stimuli to one 
response but in this case they are from one stimulus to two responses.  One of the responses 
integrates various processed features of the situation (preference).  The other response 
purports to analyse specifically the stimulus feature (caffeine), by use of the acknowledged 
term under which to conceptualise such a stimulus (bitter). 
Such data provide measures of the following three distinct discriminations (Booth & 
Freeman, 1993).  Each of the two conceptual responses discriminates between levels of the 
material stimulus.  In addition, one of the responses discriminates between levels of the other 
response.  The influence of the analytical descriptor concept on the integrative preference is of 
more interest here and so that is the direction of conceptual discrimination tested in this paper. 
 Those three discriminative processes might interact with each other.  Such hypotheses 
bear on the issue of what an assessor had in mind when deciding the integrative judgment of 
preference.  The simplest covert interaction is an influence on the integrative response from 
the relationship of the analytical response to the stimulus (Booth & Freeman, 1993).  In other 
words, preferences might discriminate between described strengths of the stimulus (the 
bitterness of caffeine) as well as between levels of stimulation (caffeine concentrations) 
and/or levels of the conceptualised quantity (bitterness ratings). 
 In addition, three types of interaction deeper in the mind can be calculated, as follows.  
The analytically descriptive function might modulate the otherwise direct effect of the 
stimulus on the integrative response.  This process corresponds more closely than the others 
hypothesised to a sensation or conscious percept that influences preference.  Alternatively, 
description might inform use of the analytical concept in deciding preference.  Such a process 
might be regarded as the intended meaning or outcome of the desired choice.  A third pair of 
possibilities is that the integrative response is influenced by the discrimination of one 
response concept by the other, either way round.  This sort of process resembles reasoning 
from concept to concept, such as deduction.  These more complex hypotheses are tested in 
this paper as well. 
 The combinations of normed discrimination distances corresponding to each of those 
seven types of mental process were calculated from an individual‟s raw data from a run 
through the object‟s variants.  Each such cognitive model produces a different set of numbers.  
The hypotheses are tested against each other by the extent that each accounts for the variance 
in the integrative response being modelled – in this paper, rated preference.  If the analytical 
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concept of bitterness is involved in the best model of the preferences judged before the 
descriptive word (bitter) was introduced, it can be concluded that the concept was in 
consciousness at that earlier time.  If the best model of preference is the caffeine stimulus on 





The assessors were 19 women and 9 men between the ages of 50 and 85 years, and 14 
women and 10 men between 20 and 45.  Both genders and the two age ranges were recruited 
in order to test for effects of biological age or generational culture, and any interaction with 
gender (see Figure 1 in Results).  The volunteers were highly familiar with the tested object 
which was their usual drink of coffee.  Each reported usually drinking at least 5 cups of 
caffeine-containing instant coffee a week.  Five assessors who also often drank ground coffee 
were excluded from the analyses of mental processing in case such experience affected details 
of performance on the samples of instant coffee tested.  Eight drank coffee without milk or 
sweetener, 21 used milk and 18 added some sugar or low-calorie sweetener as well as milk 
(the effects of which were also checked in Results; Figure 1). 
Materials   
The stimulus tested for discriminative subception was the taste of caffeine.  Levels of 
gustatory stimulation were varied by adding measured amounts of caffeine to cups each 
containing a fixed amount of decaffeinated coffee solids.  The mask was the complex taste of 
roasted coffee, including compounds other than caffeine that stimulate gustatory receptors 
that evoke effects to which the English word “bitter” is applied.  There is a wide variety of 
receptors for bitter compounds and caffeine is unlikely to stimulate all of those on which roast 
coffee compounds act.  Hence the mask provided a constant level of noise both in peripheral 
channels processing the stimulus and in centrally convergent channels, as well as providing 
distractors such as acid tastants, coffee aroma, mildness or strength of roast, and the rest of 
the object and its situation of use.  
Unmarked cups were pre-prepared with a standard amount of decaffeinated instant 
coffee powder and caffeine at one of approximately equal-ratio (1.5 to 2) steps (5, 10, 20, 35, 
50, 80, 120, 180, 270 or 405 mg per cup).  Each sample to be tasted was made in the presence 
of the assessor by adding hot water and the assessor‟s usual amounts of milk and/or sugar or 




The participant was presented with each sample of coffee in turn and asked to take one 
or two good sips before rating that drink.   Successive samples were selected from the pre-
prepared set in order to minimise biases on each assessor‟s responses, in the following way.   
The first sample contained approximately the amount of caffeine that was usual in 
instant coffee at that time (35 or 50 mg per cup).  The second sample was two or three steps 
below or above the first.  The third sample was one or more steps in the other direction, to an 
extent projected to be rated by that individual at least as far from the most preferred level of 
caffeine as the second sample had been in the opposite direction.  This algorithm was 
intended to minimise range bias (Conner et al., 1987), while also as far as possible pre-
empting centring bias (Poulton, 1979).  Two or three more samples were presented at other 
levels of caffeine, in an effort to even up the ratings above and below ideal (“always choose”) 
for that assessor while filling any large gaps. This procedure was adopted to reduce frequency 
biases as well as range bias (Parducci, 1963) in each individual‟s responses.  It has the 
consequence that assessors taste and rate different sets of coffee drinks. 
The first set of samples was each rated for preference, from zero meaning “I‟d never 
choose this brand” to nine meaning “I‟d always choose this brand.”   That set of five or six 
drinks was then presented once more as freshly made samples in a different sequence (usually 
reverse order).  This time, however, after again rating degree of preference, the assessor 
judged how bitter that sample was, from a score of one for “not at all bitter” to nine for “as 
bitter as my usual coffee” (mid-point of the response format) and appropriately higher scores 
for greater bitterness.  This approach resolves a number of deficiencies in both category 
scaling and magnitude estimation (Booth, 2009; Booth et al., 1983).   
Measurement of discriminative performance 
The individuals‟ Weber fractions of caffeine in our earlier brief report (Booth et al., 
1989) were calculated from judgments of preference after the individual‟s function of ratings 
on caffeine for each run had been „unfolded‟ (Coombs, 1964) at her/his most preferred level 
(ideal point) to give a log-linear relationship (Booth, Thompson & Shahedian, 1983; Conner 
et al., 1988).  However, the isosceles triangle assumed in such unfolding cannot be expected 
to fit the data well if any other influence on the responses is far from its norm.  The reason is 
that quantitative judgments of an object or situation with multiple features fit the surface of a 
cone away from its top.  The psychophysical function for any one feature cuts vertically 
through the „side‟ of a cone at a distance from the apex that depends on how far any other 
feature is from its apical level on average (Booth & Freeman, 1993).  That is, the judged 
distances from the assessor‟s norm for the object plotted vertically against stimulus levels 
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horizontally falls on a perpendicular conic section, i.e. an hyperbola with its rounded peak at 
the ideal level.   
The discriminative performance of a response on the levels of the stimulus is 
calculated from the best fitting hyperbola estimated by least squares regression, using the 
classic formula for a JND (Torgerson, 1956), i.e. the Weber fraction plus one.  The formula 
applies also to the conceptualised quantities driving another response when the logarithmic 
differences (ratios) of the measurement of levels of a material stimulus are replaced by 
untransformed scores from those ratings.  The term JND is replaced by half-discriminated 
disparity (HDD) because no threshold (“just”) is presupposed, the discrimination may or may 
not be conscious (“noticeable”) and neither the material ratios nor the conceptual intervals are 
presumed to affect the magnitudes of subjective experiences such as sensations (“difference”).  
The unsigned slope (dR/dS) of the asymptotes to the hyperbola is divided into the square root 
of the mean square error in responses (dR).  The resulting stimulus disparity (dS) is set to 
halfway between zero and complete discrimination by multiplying it by twice the z value for 
25% of the normal distribution of responses, i.e. superposing the 75th percentile of the lower 
level of the stimulus (S0) on the 25th percentile of the higher level (S1) on each other (Conner 
et al., 1988; Thurstone, 1927; Torgerson, 1958). 
Multisensory, multiconceptual normed discrimination scaling 
The analytical (bitterness) and integrative (preference) psychophysical functions each 
provide an optimum value for the stimulus (caffeine) as well as an HDD.  The level of 
caffeine interpolated at the “usual bitterness” or “always choose” response anchor is the norm 
point (NP) from the respective function. The discrimination function of the integrative 
response (preference) for the analytical concept (bitterness) also has an HDD and NP.  The 
function‟s HDD is a measure of the assessor‟s tolerance of deviations from her/his NP.  
These HDDs provide the unit for scaling the distance of each sample from that NP for 
that individual in that session.  The resulting discrimination distances can then be compared 
with each other by least-squared deviates for linear fit to a set of integrative ratings. 
Similarity between or among discriminative processes in their influence on integration 
can be identified as the successful accounting for variance by addition of distances along one 
dimension.  A categorical distinction between two functions (of solo or summed distances) is 
represented by the distances of the samples‟ levels from the norm along two orthogonal 
dimensions.  Since Pythagoras‟s theorem generalises across any number of orthogonals, the 
square root of the sum of squares generates whatever dimensionality improves the fit to the 
set of integrative ratings (Booth & Freeman, 1993).   
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 The seven types of mental process characterised at the end of the Introduction can 
each be labelled by a single word, with a corresponding letter code.  One predictor of the 
integrative judgment of preference is the level of the stimulus, a stimulatory (S) model.  This 
is an observed psychophysical relationship but it can specify a mental process when HDD-
scaled distances of stimulus levels from NP are better predictive of the integrative judgments 
than are any of the other six types of model, each of which implicates the stimulus only 
indirectly at best. 
The analytical ratings of the feature by themselves provide another predictor of the 
integrative ratings.  This calculation tests the hypothesis that the integrative response 
(preference) is influenced by covert input from the concept behind the analytical ratings of 
bitterness.  Such response (R) models are called conceptual.   
The integrative judgment can be influenced covertly by another observed relationship, 
the traditional psychophysical function for a conceptualised material feature (here of a real 
object, not in artificial isolation).  Best accounting for such object recognition by this 
hypothesis indicates that successful description of the stimulus feature by the analytical 
response (S/R) plays a role in those integrative judgments of the samples.  Hence this S/R 
calculation is called a descriptive model of the integration.   
Two deeper levels of processing are also considered in this paper, based on models 
developed since Booth and Freeman (1993).  The HDDs from NP can be calculated for the 
caffeine/bitterness descriptive function on caffeine levels and the data so scaled (S//S/R) used 
to predict the ratings of preference.  This can be interpreted as a perceptual process, since it is 
descriptive (S/R) of stimulation (S) – in this experiment, most closely corresponding to what 
has traditionally been called a sensation of taste.   
A process on the output side also can be estimated, using the HDDs from NP for 
bitterness ratings (R) on the caffeine/bitterness function (S/R), an S/R//R model.  Since this 
prediction of the integrative judgment is a response under a description, it has the nature of an 
intended meaning.   So S/R//R processes are called intentions.   
After these elemental models of different types of mental process have been estimated 
from an individual‟s data for a session, each pair of elements is tested for operation over a 
single communication channel within the mind.  Sameness or superposition is realised 
quantitatively as additivity.  Difference or separation amounts to orthogonality.  Therefore 
each pair of elements, model A and model B, is tested for a similarity between A and B by 
adding the distances from NP in HDDs to see if the interaction A + B accounts for more of 
the variance in the judgment being modelled than does either A or B alone.  Validated in this 
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way, the function A + B identifies and measures a channel processing a similarity between A 
and B that may turn out to contribute to the modelled judgment.    
The three functions A, B and A + B are then tested for categorical differences from 
each other, i.e. to see if they operate over channels that are orthogonal.  If the square root of 
the sum of the squares of HDDs from NP of each pair of functions (e.g., A and B) accounts 
for more variance in the integrative judgments than does either of the pair‟s elements alone, 
that is evidence that distinct aspects of each element interact to influence the modelled 
response (Booth & Freeman, 1993).  Such two-dimensional integration is coded as A Г B, 
where Г (capital gamma) represents the square root of the sum of squares. [Greek u.c. gamma] 
Both similarity and differences between A and B can occur.  That is, the one-
dimensional model A + B and the two-dimensional A Г B can each account for some variance 
in the integrative response. It is then possible that the three-dimensional model, A Г B Г (A + 
B), is more predictive of the integrative judgments than any of the three pairs, A Г B, A Г (A 
+ B) and B Г (A + B).    
The best multidimensional discrimination model of the integrative judgments 
(preferences) by an individual assessor in a session is used in this paper to address the 
question if that performance involves implicit processing of differences in analytical response 
(bitterness) between instances of the object (coffee) and, if so, whether that processing is 
conscious or may not be.  The preference judgments were taken to involve the concept of 
bitterness implicitly if the best model of preference ratings made before the term bitter was 
mentioned to the assessor nonetheless included data from the subsequent ratings of bitterness, 
i.e. any of the perceptual (S//S/R), descriptive (S/R) and intentional (S/R//R) models, or the 
bare conceptual model (R) that shows an explicit influence of the concept on preference.  If 
the bitterness concept were not involved at all in the most successful account of preference, i.e. 
it was a purely stimulatory model (S), this would be evidence by contrast that the concept was 
not used in those initial judgments of preference and so the differences in intensity of the taste 
of caffeine at that stage could have been subconscious.
1
  
The above calculations from the raw data for each session for an individual participant 
have been programmed into a Java applet (Co-Pro 2.29).  This tool outputs the HDD and NP 
for each psychophysical function and the best-fitting model of the mental processes involved 
(as well as the other valid models that did not cover as much of the variance in the modelled 
response).   
Statistical analyses 
The characteristics of individual assessors were compared within or between groups 
by analysis of ranks or variance as appropriate, using SPSS 16.0.   
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Results 
Better integrative than analytical discrimination 
Over half of the participants were better at discriminating between levels of the 
stimulus (caffeine) by their integrative judgments (preferences) than by their analytical 
judgments (bitternesses).  Initially rated choices by 34 out of the 52 assessors had a lower 
Weber fraction than intensities rated using the stimulus-specific descriptor (Figure 1).  After 
descriptive ratings were introduced, there were still 28 assessors who were more 
discriminative in their overall preferences than in their analytic conceptualisation. 
Figure 1 here 
These individuals with better discriminative integration were likely to have been as 
aware of the analytical characteristic of all the samples of the object as the other assessors 
were, because the constant mask shared that characteristic with the varied stimulus.  So, by 
the conventional verbal criterion, they cannot be said to be processing the presence of the 
stimulus subconsciously.  Nevertheless, they failed to distinguish disparities in the intensity of 
the characteristic coming from the stimulus in this context as effectively as they discriminated 
stimulus levels in their likings for the samples.  Those with that pattern of performance are 
therefore categorised as “integrative discriminators” of the bitterness of caffeine.  Those 
having a better Weber fraction for analytical judgments than for integration were labeled as 
“analytical discriminators.”  An integrating discriminator would be shown to be 
subconsciously processing disparities in level of caffeine if her or his analytical ratings of 
bitterness did not account for the integrative performance. 
 The direction of the difference in discrimination between the integrative and analytical 
responses was not associated with the proportion of variance in either sort of judgment by an 
individual that was accounted for by levels of the stimulus.  About half of both analytical and 
integrative discriminators had a normed psychophysical function with r
2
 < 0.1, whereas most 
of the others in each group had r
2
 values in the range 0.47 to 0.81.  
Multiple discrimination scaling of rated preferences 
The interactions among discriminal processes that best accounted for each individual‟s 
two sets of integrative judgments were examined in two ways.  One formula (an R model) 
treated the analytical response as a potential conceptual influence on integration (Booth & 
Freeman, 1993).  The other formula (an S model) treated the analytical term as a covert 
symbolic stimulus, discriminated in equal differences in rated intensity.   
             In some individuals, the interaction of this sort that accounted for most variance in the 
integrative judgments was very low (r
2
 < 0.5 in 17% with the analytical concept treated as a 
stimulus and 61% with it treated as a response), although 55% of the models with the concept 
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as a stimulus had r
2
 > 0.8.  Given the difficulty of the perceptual task imposed by this 
experiment, it is likely that some assessors changed strategy at least once over the series of 
five samples; if so, it would be logically impossible for a single model of any sort to fit the 
data.  
             Integrators and analysts did not differ in the proportion who processed integration 
purely in terms of the analytical concept.  However, the response-driven descriptive processes 
of integration, conceptually modulated (R/R) or not (R), were numerically higher in 
proportion to the stimulus-driven perceptual (S//S/R) and stimulatory (S) processes among the 
integrators than among the analysts.  This difference in distribution between the groups 
approached reliability, 
2
(2) = 5.58, P = 0.061.  Thus there was no general evidence of more 
prevalent direct control of integration by the stimulus among integrative discriminators.  
Integrative processing after analytical judgments 
First we consider the most successful multiple-discrimination model of each person‟s 
integrative judgments after a way had been provided to conceptualise the actual disparities 
between samples.  The participants were asked to rate the bitterness of each coffee as well as 
to rate preference again.  These later preferences are explained in this section of Results.  
Analytical judgment as response.  After the analytical term was introduced, 
integration was decided by using that concept in a majority (58%) of the 47 assessors 
(excluding those who also used ground coffee).   The proportion of these models did not 
differ appreciably between integrators (55%) and analysts (61%), but the median of the 
variance in the integrative judgments that they accounted for was greater among the 
integrators, Mann-Whitney U = 144, P < 0.01.  There was no clear evidence that this control 
of integration by the analytical concept (high r
2
) was attributable to the control of the concept 
by the stimulus (low Weber fraction), Spearman‟s [Greek letter rho] ρ(27) = 0.29, two-tailed P < 
0.14.  This was true even among models accounting for more than 0.49 of the variance in 
integration, [Gk. rho] ρ(15) = 0.37, two-tailed P < 0.18.   Indeed, in many assessors the 
analytical judgments showed poor Weber ratios for the stimulus.  Hence the good models of 
integration were likely to depend on the operation of the analytical concept by itself, not on 
any influence on the concept by the stimulus.  
It is worth noting that the integrative processes that involved the analytical concept in 
some more complex way having r
2
 > 0.49 were descriptive (S/R) in three assessors and 
intentional (S/R//R) or perceptual (S//S/R) in one each.  Two assessors had a caffeine-
stimulatory (S) model of these initial preferences.   
 Analytical judgment as stimulus.  A complementary picture emerged when the 
analytical scores were treated as conceptual stimulation alongside the material stimulation 
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from the varied levels of the stimulus.  A majority of the assessors (67%) processed the 
material (caffeine) and conceptual (bitterness) stimuli as separate influences on the integrative 
response (preference).  However, integration by a few assessors (11%) discriminated some 
similarity between the material stimulus and the conceptual stimulus (that is, operating as a 
single mental process), with or without some residual difference in the concept as well 
(through a second process).  The best model for integration in each of the remaining assessors 
(four out of 47) was only the material (7%) or only the concept (7%) as stimulus.   
Hence the findings from this use of normed discrimination scaling indicated that 
distraction by the task of descriptive analysis rather seldom destroyed all influence of the 
material stimulus on the integrative judgments. 
Integrative processing before analytical judgments 
That evidence for analysis during integration has provided a basis for considering if 
the analytical concept had some role in the integrative judgments made on the first set of 
samples, before the experimenter had mentioned the analytical term.  The analytical ratings 
from the second run through the samples were used in the discrimination modelling of the 
integrative ratings in the first run.  These calculations test if levels of the analytical concept 
were used in those initial integrative judgments.  The findings could identify any instance of 
covert self-presentation of the analytical concept to label the samples.  
 Analytical term as concept during initial integration.  Although the analytical term 
had yet to be mentioned, the best explanation of the first ratings of preference was the later 
bitterness ratings in 31 (66%) of the 47 assessors modelled.  In 23 (74%) of this 31, the 
second run‟s integration into preference was also driven by the analytical concept of 
bitterness.  All but six of these consistently conceptual assessors increased or stayed the same 
in the variance accounted for in the integrative judgments during the second run; those who 
decreased did so only slightly (reductions in r
2
 of 1% to 13%).  These results indicate that 
many of the assessors were using their analytical concept in their integration before the word 
had been mentioned.  Nevertheless, as would be expected, the concept‟s influence on 
integration was usually increased by the explicit introduction of the usual term for describing 
the stimulus.     
 Most of the other participants‟ initial integrative judgments were best accounted for by 
more complex processes involving the analytical concept (N = 15).  The majority of this 
remaining group (11; 23% of the 47 modelled) decided their integrative ratings by a process 
of describing the stimulus (S/R).  Two assessors used bitterness to conceptualise the 
description (S/R//R), perhaps the intention in the integrative decision.  Two further assessors 
used description on the stimulus side of processing, to modulate stimulatory processing 
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(S//S/R).  That is, they may have decided their preferences in accord with a sensation of the 
characteristic of the stimulus. 
Just six of the 47 participants modelled used only the levels of the stimulus to decide 
their degree of preference for each sample coffee first time around (S model).  The best of 
these stimulation processes had r
2
 = 0.69 merely and the other five ranged from 0.32 to 0.06. 
 Analytical term as stimulus in first integration.  When the later analytical ratings 
were used to estimate any influence of that concept as a stimulus to the first set of integrative 
ratings, combination of the manipulated stimulus and of the analytical concept as a stimulus 
was found in a similar majority of assessors (73%) to that with the second set of samples.  A 
few assessors (5 out of the 47) discriminated some similarity between the material stimulus 
and the conceptual stimulus, either as the sole process (in 6%) or as one of the processes 
within a two-process model (in 4%). The proportions of the whole set of assessors having the 
different sorts of model did not differ noticeably between runs.  On the other hand, this line of 
modelling did not often show consistency between the two runs within individual assessors. 
The remaining assessors had best models of only the stimulus (12%, twice as many as 
when the concept was rated) or of only the concept (4%, half the number during analytical 
ratings).  Hence the assessors who did not achieve any sort of integrative response were in 
general less distracted by attention to the analytical concept than when the word was in overt 
use and were more susceptible to disparities in the strength of gustatory stimulation by 
caffeine.   
Stimulus processing among integrators: implicit vs. subconscious 
The integrative discriminators showed great diversity in the best multiple 
discriminations model of their integrative judgments during the first run through the stimulus-
varied samples of the object.   
A majority (19 of the 28) made implicit use of the concept that they used in analytical 
judgments during the second run through the samples.  However, in four of these assessors, 
this conceptual (R) model accounted for less than a quarter of the variance in the assessor‟s 
initial integrative judgments (r
2
 between 0.12 and 0.19).  For seven, nevertheless, r
2
 was 0.7 
or over.  This left little or no reason to doubt that the analytical concept, made explicit later 
only, was controlling these assessors‟ initial stimulus-discriminating integration.   
This implicit use of the analytical concept was further indicated by the fact that 13 
assessors determined their preferences by the process of conceptualising bitterness in both 
runs through the coffee samples.  Moreover, the variances accounted for by these models 
were highly correlated between runs.  The correlation was kept down to r = 0.56 (P < 0.05) by 
two of the five assessors with the lowest variances accounted for in integrative judgments 
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during the first run (r
2
 =< 0.30) having among the four strongest conceptual models in the 
second run (increasing r
2
 from 0.19 to 0.87 and from 0.30 to 0.91).  Excluding those two 
assessors, the correlation between variances accounted for by conceptual models of 
integration in the first and second runs was r = 0.88, P < 0.001, with r
2
 ranging from 0.06 to 
0.96, median 0.60.  That is, these eleven assessors, each with a Weber fraction for initial 
integration better than the fraction for later analysis, were thinking with their analytical 
concept while making integrative judgments as clearly before the experimenter introduced the 
analytical term as they were afterwards. 
A substantial minority (seven) of the integrative discriminators made a deeper use of 
their analytical concept in their integrative ratings.  Six used the concept to describe the 
stimulus (r
2
 of an S/R model ranging from 0.97 down to 0.14).  One used that description in 
her analytical conceptualistion of bitterness (S/R//R r
2
 = 0.49).   
In summary, even though the initial judgments of preference by these integrating 
discrminators were more differentially sensitive to the stimulus than were their analytical 
judgments of bitterness in the second run, nearly all of them (26 of the 28) put their analytical 
concept to implicit use in deciding this first set of integrative judgments.    
Only the remaining two of the 28 assessors with better Weber fractions for integration 
than for analysis had their initial judgments of preference driven directly by levels of the 
gustatory stimulation by caffeine (S model r
2
 of 0.69 or 0.32).  In these participants it is 
possible that the integrative judgments of preference discriminated between levels of the 
stimulus outside of consciousness.   
There was one further indication that each of these two assessors integrated by means 
of subconscious discrimination of the level of the stimulus from a personal norm.  The Weber 
fractions for these two assessors‟ integrative judgments did not improve after the introduction 
of the analytical term by the experimenter.  This contrasts with what was observed in many of 
the other assessors (reported above).  We have seen that all the other better discriminators by 
integration than by analysis were aware of differences in the analytical intensity at some level 
during the initial run.  If these two assessors were successfully discriminating subconsciously 
between levels of the stimulus, the descriptor conceptualising the stimulus might well have 
been of no use to them in that task, even when put to explicit use. 
Finally, it should be mentioned that none of these perceivers of differences in stimulus 
levels in their first set of integrative judgments decided those initial preferences by variations 
in a sensation (an S//S/R model) consisting of a description of the gustatory stimulation by 
caffeine that relied on the word bitter to concepualise that stimulus.  This weighs against the 
widespread assumption that psychophysical judgments measure subjective magnitudes. 
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Discussion 
Normed discrimination approach to consciousness and cognition 
 The idea that subconscious processing enables fast decisions in life has become 
popular again recently (Gladwell, 2005).  Nevertheless the evidence remains very thin.  
Common methods for addressing the issue are laborious to execute and coarse-grained in the 
structure of the data.  The presupposition has been that it is impossible to measure ongoing 
performance in any detail because of diversity among individuals and instability within the 
individual.  However, if a particular sort of situation is varied within a familiar range, the 
influences of inputs on outputs can be measured within an individual and rapidly as well 
(Conner, Land & Booth, 1987).  Interactions among mediating mental processes can be 
characterised by use of normed discrimination as a common metric among both material and 
symbolic sources of information (Booth & Freeman, 1993).  Now that this approach has been 
fully implemented computationally, the present paper illustrates its potential for advancing the 
understanding of subconscious perception in life.  
Subconscious or implicit perception of differences? 
Over half the participants in this experiment discriminated between levels of one of a 
familiar object‟s features better by their integrative judgments (i.e., preferences) on samples 
of the otherwise unvaried object than they did by judgments focused on the feature identified 
by its usual verbal label (i.e., bitterness).  This finding can be taken to indicate that the feature 
had a higher discrimination „threshold‟ than the whole object in those people under these 
circumstances.  These participants might be considered to be differential subceivers.   
However, the evidence also was that most of those apparently subconscious 
discriminators were using the verbal label or a related concept to judge overall before that 
label for the feature had been made explicit by the experimenter.  Only about 7% of the 
seeming subceivers provided evidence that they might have been processing disparities in 
levels of the varied feature subconsciously with respect to the verbal label.   
 This result illustrates how individualised multiple discrimination scaling can address 
difficulties that have arisen during work using detection paradigms.  It is far from obvious 
how to choose a criterion by which to identify perception that is subconscious in some 
absolute sense (Merikle et al., 2001).   For example, the label applied to the perceived feature 
may not capture all that represents that feature in consciousness.  That problem is reduced by 
the diagnosis of covert processing that is delivered by multiple discrimination scaling.   
Another problem for research into the mental processes of consciousness is that the 
response used as the indicator of perception of the feature even if it were subconscious may 
not be captured by the same metric as that used on the feature in awareness.  Discrimination 
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uses the same Thurstone (1927) Case V comparison formula as detection to provide an 
intensity spanning metric that is independent of physical units of measurement, the half-
discriminated disparity (HDD).   This unit of divergence between strengths of a material 
stimulus is the „just-noticeable difference‟ interpreted objectively (Torgerson, 1958).  Ernst 
and Banks (2002) used just the response variances to account for dominance of one sensory 
modality over another.  That approach is less flexible than the scaling in HDDs, because these 
involve the slope as well as the mean square error of the psychophysical function.  Scaling on 
the HDD also permits many other integration rules to be tested.  Furthermore, the HDD can 
be used to scale any sort of stimulus, whether symbolic (like the word bitter) or material, like 
caffeine (Booth & Freeman, 1993; Conner et al., 1988; Freeman & Booth, 2010).   
In addition, normed multiple discrimination has a more fundamental merit, providing 
a substantial improvement on multiple detection (Macmillan & Creelman, 2004).  The 
characteristic features of objects are „suprathreshold‟ in general, and indeed almost by 
definition.  Hence, contrary to the presupposition of classical psychophysics, the 
psychological zero is not absence of the feature but its usual level in objects within a 
particular perceptual category.  What needs to be detected is not the presence of the signal but 
a difference in signal strength from its norm.  Once that step towards realism has been taken, 
then extraordinarily complex situations may become amenable to experimental analysis.  
These include not only familiar mixtures of tastants (Booth, Freeman, Konle, Wainwright & 
Sharpe, under review; Booth, Konle & Sharpe, 2008) but also mixtures of odorants simulating 
a natural aroma containing dozens of smelt compounds (Booth, Freeman & Kendal-Reed, 
1995; Booth, Kendal-Read & Freeman, under review; Kendal-Read & Booth, 1992), the 
amplitudes and frequencies of microfracture patterns heard during the crushing of a material 
(Booth, Earl & Mobini, 2003) or of viscous arrays of fat droplets rubbing over tactile 
receptors (Richardson & Booth, 1993), and the conceptual attributes of pictured objects 
(Booth, Sharpe, Chechlasz et al., under review).    
Traditional presuppositions in psychophysics make caffeine in water appear to be 
much simpler to investigate perceptually than caffeine in coffee.  However, purity and 
precision of control come with artificiality.  In contrast, consistently with many theories of 
perceptual learning, a familiar reality creates a „template‟ and „hidden variables‟.  The linear 
responding that has been acquired to valid affordances provides a powerful tool for dissecting 
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These interactions among elemental processes can be estimated without regard to type of 
process („open‟ modelling) or each hypothesis can be confined to a single type of process 
(„closed‟ modelling).  In the present data and in the variety of other types of data that we have 
analysed this way so far (papers under review or in preparation), the most predictive open 
models have generally accounted for very little more variance by their greater complexity 
than have the best closed models.  Hence, to economise on space, only the results of closed 
modelling are presented here. 
 
Caption to Figure 
Figure 1.  Proportion (%) of each subset of participants whose initial integration was more 
(left-hand bar) or less (right-hand bar) discriminative than their later analysis, split by age 
group, gender and the absence or presence of added material obscuring or countering the 
stimulus.  Left side: age ranges in years (each N = 26).  Middle: female (N = 32) or male (N = 
20).  Right side: plain coffee (unsweetened, unmilked: UU; N = 8); unsweetened coffee with 
milk (UM; N = 21); sweetened coffee with milk (SM; N = 18). *For UM, χ2(2) = 6.03, P < 
0.05.  Better discrimination of caffeine by preference might be induced by milk‟s blockade of 
receoptors for distractors in roast coffee flavour.  Sweeteners on the other hand might counter 
all bitterness centrally including that of caffeine. 
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